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ARTICLE
The Ferrini Doctrine: Abrogating State Immunity from Civil Suit

for Jus Cogens Violations
Natasha Marusja Saputo*
ABSTRACT

Article 10 of the Italian Constitution incorporates generally recognized principles of international law.1
Thus, State immunity from civil suit in the domestic courts of another State—a principle generally
recognized in international law—would apply in Italy. However, the protection of fundamental human rights
is another generally recognized principle in international law and the ostensible conflict between these two
principles has resulted in a series of controversial rulings issued by the Italian Court of Cassation. These
rulings allow for the abrogation of State immunity from civil suit in the domestic courts of another State for
alleged violations of jus cogens or peremptory norms2—what this paper will refer to as the Ferrini doctrine.
Although the central premise behind the Court’s reasoning appeals to the values underlying international
law, it is by no means authoritative under the international law regime in which rules and principles are
developed through consensus of what is generally recognized. As such, the Italian Court of Cassation’s
decisions are not just controversial they are technically unlawful under customary international law.
However, such deviation is the sole means through which customary international law changes and evolves.
Were the Italian Court of Cassation to make its reasoning logically consistent and, at this initial stage, less
sweeping in breadth, the Ferrini doctrine arguably has the potential to be effectively exported to other States
thereby furthering a change in customary international law on State immunity.
This paper will: (1) provide a brief survey of some of the Italian Court of Cassation’s controversial
rulings regarding State immunity from civil suit; (2) examine the responses to the decisions from other
States and academia to evaluate the validity of such a rule; (3) propose a revised version of the Ferrini
doctrine which would enhance its viability and impact on customary international law; and (4) reach a
conclusion as to whether such a change is advisable.

*
1
2

LL.M., with Distinction and Dean’s List Honors, Georgetown University Law Center, May 2011. Recipient of the Thomas B.
Chetwood S.J. Prize. J.D. Magna Cum Laude, George Mason University School of Law, May 2010.
See Art. 10 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), available at http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_ing
lese.pdf (English) (“The Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognized principles of international law.”).
Jus cogens, also known as a peremptory norm of international law, is a “norm of general international law . . . accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 50, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://unt
reaty.un.org/cod/diplomatic conferences/lawoftreaties-1969/vol/english/confdocs.pdf.
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I.

ITALIAN COURT OF CASSATION: DECISIONS ON STATE IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL
SUIT
A. FERRINI

Luigi Ferrini filed suit against the Federal Republic of Germany in the Italian Court of Arezzo on
September 23, 1998 seeking damages for his 1944 capture in Italy by German armed forces and
subsequent deportation and forced labor in Germany.1 The Court of Arezzo held that the claim was not
within the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, finding that Germany was shielded from suit by “the Principle
of State immunity” because Ferrini’s claim arose from actions “carried out by a foreign State in the
exercise of its sovereign powers.”2 The Florence Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s reasoning and
dismissed Ferrini’s appeal.3 However, the Italian Court of Cassation reversed, holding that “the Federal
Republic of Germany does not have the right to be declared immune from the jurisdiction of the Italian
courts.”4
The Court of Cassation began with the premise that while the existence of State immunity was “beyond
question . . . the extent of this principle . . . is gradually becoming more limited.”5 With this in mind the
Court framed the issue facing it as:
[W]hether immunity from jurisdiction is capable of operating even in respect of conduct which . . .
is so extremely serious that, in the context of customary international law, it belongs to that
category of international crimes which are so prejudicial to universal values that they transcend the
interests of individual States.6
The Court reasoned that although the “modus operandi” of the exercise of a State’s sovereign
powers is “beyond censure . . . this does not prevent investigations from being launched into possible
crimes committed during the course of the activities.”7 Moreover, under Article 10(1) of the Italian
Constitution, violations of fundamental human rights, which constitute international crimes come within
the purview of the Italian judiciary.8 The Court held that deportation and forced labor were, now and at
the time of the acts in question, recognized as war crimes and violations of international law by “all
civilized nations.”9
The Court of Cassation asserted that it is increasingly recognized that international crimes
“threaten the whole of humanity and undermine the foundations of peaceful international relations” and
that human rights are “norms, from which no derogation is permitted, which lie at the heart of the
international order and prevail over all other conventional and customary norms, including those which
relate to State immunity.”10 Reasoning by analogy, the Court concluded that if grave human rights
violations constitute crimes under international law for which universal jurisdiction applies, “there is no
doubt that the principle of universal jurisdiction also applies to civil actions which trace their origins to
such crimes.”11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Cass., sez. un. 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro It., 2004, I, ¶ 1 (It.) [hereinafter Ferrini].
Id. ¶ 1.1.
Id. ¶ 1.2.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 7.1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.2.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
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According to the Court, divesting States of their immunity for grave human rights violations is
logically required given that the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (“Draft Articles”)12 prohibits States from abetting situations which lead to violations of international
law and affirmatively requires States to use reasonable means to stop the violations.13 The Court found
that recognizing immunity of a State in blatant violation of “inviolable” human rights14 would undermine
the protection of those rights.15 Fashioning a rule of interpretation the Court held, “[t]here is no doubt that
a contradiction between two equally binding legal norms ought to be resolved by giving precedence to the
norm with the highest status” and that protection of human rights has a higher status than the principle of
State immunity.16
Seeking to distinguish more recent cases in which courts upheld State immunity, the Court noted that in
the case at bar: (1) the act from which the claim arose began in the forum State (Italy); and (2) the act
constitutes “an international crime.”17 However, it does not appear that these two distinguishing
characteristics are conjunctive prerequisites to the abrogation of State immunity. At the end of its opinion
the Court concluded that the fact the act commenced in the forum was irrelevant because as the act
constituted an international crime. As a result universal jurisdiction would apply.18
The Court further observed that the United States’ amendment of its Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”) recognized that courts should not uphold State immunity in cases of human rights violations.19 The
Court criticized the fact that the United States only created an exception to State immunity under the FSIA
for US State Department-determined “sponsors of terrorism,” finding that such an approach was not in
accordance with “the principle of the ‘sovereign equality’ of States.”20 However, the Court also noted the
importance of the United States’ acceptance of the primacy of protecting fundamental human rights over the
principle of State immunity—the United States had previously been a fierce adherent of “the theory of
absolute immunity.”21
Finally, the Court reasoned by analogy that since functional immunity of State officials is inapplicable
in cases involving international crimes, “there can be no valid reason to maintain the immunity of the State
and therefore to deny that its responsibility can be enforced before the judicial authority of a foreign
State.”22
B. MANTELLI
On May 29, 2008 the Italian Court of Cassation issued a series of orders that reiterated and expanded
its holding in Ferrini. The orders held that States accused of international crimes are not immune from civil
jurisdiction in the courts of another State.23 Specifically, the Court denied the Federal Republic of Germany
State immunity from civil suit for the deportation and forced labor of Italian citizens during World War II.24
Despite its citation to a number of State supreme court and international court cases upholding State
immunity even in the face of accusations of international crimes, the Court held that these decisions only
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, 113–14, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentari es/ 9_6_2001.pdf.
Ferrini, supra note 1, ¶ 9 (citing Article 41 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts).
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9.1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 10.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Cass. sez. un., 29 maggio 2008, n. 14201, Foro it. 2008, I, ¶ 11 (It.) [Hereinafter Mantelli].
Id.
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demonstrated that a human rights exception to State immunity was not, as yet, a definite international
custom but that such an exception was in the process of emerging.25
With regard to jurisdiction, the Court was even more sweeping in its assertion than in Ferrini, holding
that the fact that the events giving rise to the suit occurred in Italy only further supported Italian jurisdiction
over the case, rather than constituting its primary basis.26 Indeed, any ambiguity left behind after Ferrini
regarding whether the violative conduct had to have occurred within the forum has been dispelled as a result
of these orders which clearly indicate that the Court believes there is no such requirement for jurisdiction.
C. LOZANO
In Italy v. Lozano, the Italian Court of Cassation addressed whether it had jurisdiction over a U.S.
soldier who had killed an Italian civilian and injured two others at a checkpoint in Iraq.27 While ultimately
holding that it did not have jurisdiction because the incident did not amount to a war crime, the Court
postulated, albeit in obiter dictum, that a State agent who commits international crimes while acting in his
official capacity may lose immunity for both himself and the State for which he was an agent.28 Such a
position would be consistent with the logic of State immunity that the Italian Court of Cassation advocated
since its decision in Ferrini. As one commentator noted, “it makes no sense to remove the immunity from
foreign criminal jurisdiction for state agents and then maintain state immunity for the same acts.”29 In
concluding that a State agent who commits international crimes loses immunity, the Court based its decision
not only on Italian case law but also on the principle that immunity must give way to allow prosecution for
violations of jus cogens.30 This is the same reasoning the Court used to remove State immunity in cases like
Ferrini, i.e., in the event of conflict, jus cogens principles prevail over other customs or rules of international
law such as State immunity.
D. CIVITELLA
In an October 10, 2006 ruling the Military Court of First Instance of La Spezia found the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) to be jointly and severally liable as a civilly responsible party with criminal
defendant Max Joseph Milde for the massacre of the Italian town of Civitella on June 29, 1944.31 The
judgment was subsequently affirmed on appeal and ultimately the Italian Court of Cassation, acting as the
court of last resort, rejected the FRG’s appeal on October 21, 2008.32
Civitella was a procedurally unique case. Italian criminal procedure allows a civil action to be brought
within a criminal trial.33 This civil action may be brought against the criminal defendant himself and/or a

25
26
27

28

29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Two of the Italians were unarmed intelligence officers who had just successfully completed a mission to rescue an Italian
journalist was kidnapped and held hostage by Iraqi insurgents. One of the intelligence officers was killed the other was injured
along with the rescued journalist. The intelligence officers were regarded as civilians because they were unarmed and not
engaged in armed hostilities. Antonio Cassese, The Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of War Crimes: the
Lozano Case, 6 INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1077, 1078 (2008). Although Lozano was a criminal case it involved a civil plaintiff which
is allowed under Article 74 of Italian Criminal Procedure.
Cass., sez. un. 24 luglio 2008, n. 31171, Foro it. 2008 II, (it.) available at http://www.cicr.org/ihlnat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/d972ce6850f24bbbc1257561003a6d58/$FILE/Italy%20v.%20Lozano%202008
.pdf [hereinafter Lozano].
Cassese, supra note 27, at 1082.
Lozano, supra note 28, ¶ 14.
Annalisa Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction Over Germany in a Criminal Case Relating to the
Second World War: The Civitella Case, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 597, 597-98 (2009).
Id. at 598; Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p] art. 74 (It.). This was also the procedural posture in Lozano. See Lozano, supra
note 28.
Ciampi, supra note 31, at 599.
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party that may be held civilly liable for the harm the crime caused.34 In Civitella, criminal proceedings were
brought against the individual defendant and then the FRG was joined as a civil defendant.35 Conversely, in
Ferrini, the case was entirely civil and only against the FRG.36 Moreover, unlike Ferrini, in which the Court
of Cassation was only making a ruling on jurisdiction while the case was pending in a court of first instance,
in Civitella, the Court heard the case as a court of last instance which allowed it a wider scope of review.37
Another interesting procedural facet was that the facts ascertained in the criminal case against the individual
defendant were applied to the FRG in the civil portion without its objection thus making the factual finding
res judicata.38
Regarding the applicability of State immunity, the Court drew on its decision in Ferrini which held that
immunity for acts jure imperii—acts of sovereign power such as actions in wartime—is abrogated if it is so
serious a violation of human rights that it constitutes a crime under international law.39 The Court in both
cases referred to this principle as a “limitation” on restrictive State immunity.40 The Court asserted that this
was a trend in Italian case law.41 In response to the contention that Ferrini and other Italian decisions do not
establish international consensus on the issue of State immunity and that State immunity has been upheld by
the supreme courts of other States, the Court averred that the solution to the apparent conflict between the
international principles of State immunity and respect and protection of fundamental human rights will not
be decided by a tally of how many cases retained or abrogated immunity.42 Rather, the “qualitative
consistency” of these rulings with customary rules and hierarchy of values in international law must be
considered.43 To some extent it is a balancing test which gives primacy to jus cogens.44 This approach led
the Court to conclude that violations of fundamental human rights constitute a crossing of the Rubicon
whereby a State abdicates its sovereign immunity.45

II.

ANALYSIS OF THE FERRINI DOCTRINE
A. HOW FAR AFIELD IS FERRINI?

Perhaps the central problem with the Italian Court of Cassation’s assertion that State immunity must be
abrogated in cases of fundamental human rights violations is that it is not in conformity with international
practice:
All national and international final decisions exclusively based on international law have hitherto
invariably affirmed the immunity rule even in cases of alleged international crimes amounting to
breaches of jus cogens. Certain international rules may be peremptory, but it does not follow that
their alleged violation by one state allows courts of another state to deny immunity to the
former—especially when practice supporting the non-immunity rule is lacking or uncertain.46
However, the Italian Court of Cassation purported to base Ferrini and its progeny on international law.
In order to evaluate whether a State that has violated jus cogens can be subject to civil suit in the courts of
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Codice penal [C.p.] art. 185 (It.).
Ciampi, supra note 31, at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.at 603-04.
Id.at 604.
Carlo Focarelli, Federal Republic of Germany v. Giovanni Mantelli and Others, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 122, 125-26 (2009).
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another State, it is instructive to look to the traditional sources of international law: State practice—
including international agreements—and secondary sources.47

i. State Practice
The only multilateral treaty regarding State immunity, the European Convention of State Immunity, as
well as its Explanatory Report, is devoid of any reference to jus cogens violations.48 The Inter-American
Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity49 and the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property50 have not yet entered into force. Importantly, neither
contains any references to jus cogens violations.51 Indeed, neither the International Law Commission’s Draft
Convention52 nor the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property53
lists loss of sovereign immunity as a legal consequence of committing acts that are wrongful under
international law.
There is a dearth of State court decisions directly adopting the Ferrini doctrine or following a similar
course of reasoning. In addition to the Italian Court of Cassation’s decisions, the decisions of national courts
in Greece refusing to recognize State immunity for violations of jus cogens while notable “do not (yet)
support a jus cogens exception to the principle of State immunity.”54
47

48

49
50

51
52
53
54

See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (laying out the sources of international law as: “a.
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b.
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102
(1987) (providing that “[a] rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of
states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to
the major legal system of the world.”).
See European Convention on State Immunity, opened for signature May 16, 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 181, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/074.htm; EXPLANATORY REPORT: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE
IMMUNITY, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/074.htm.
Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States, Jan. 21, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 292 (1983) [hereinafter InterAmerican Draft Convention].
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n: Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 43d Sess., April 29July 19, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/46/10; GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, pt. 2 (1991) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/engl ish/draft%20articles/4_1_1991.pdf.
See Inter-American Draft Convention, supra note 50; ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51.
See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 50.
U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property, adopted on 2 December 2004 by the U.N. GAOR;
see also, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/49 Vol. I., (Sept. 14 –Dec. 23 2004).
Thomas Giegerich, Do Damages Claims Arising From Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the Jurisdiction of
Foreign Courts? in The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes 203,
222 (Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin, eds. 2006). (During World War II, German forces massacred a Greek
village. Greek survivors and victim’s families brought civil suits against Germany in November 1995. On October 30, 1997,
the District Court of Livadeia awarded judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that a State, which violated jus cogens norms
cannot invoke State immunity. Germany appealed this decision to the Areios Pagos (Greek Supreme Court), which affirmed
the lower court’s judgment, holding that breaches of peremptory norms cannot be jure imperii (sovereign acts) and that by
violating such norms a State tacitly waives its immunity. [Note, that this reasoning is different from Ferrini doctrine which
does not rely on tacit waiver of immunity to assert jurisdiction. See infra note 252.] However, the plaintiffs were unable to
attach any of Germany’s assets within Greece because under Article 923 of the Greek Civil Code, the Greek Justice Minister is
required to approve such attachment and he refused. Meanwhile, a Special High Court was convened to address the matter and
held that Germany was immune from suit because there was not yet a jus cogens exception under customary international law
to State immunity. The plaintiffs appealed to the European Court of Human Rights claiming, inter alia, that the Justice
Minister’s refusal to authorize attachment of German assets violated Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention by
denying them access to the courts. The ECHR held that while the plaintiffs’ access to the courts may have been restricted, the
restriction was justified to maintain good relations between States, and the restriction was proportional because there was not
yet a jus cogens recognized exception to State immunity in customary international law.); Kerstin Bartsch & Björn Elberling,
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The only State with national legislation that comes close to denying immunity to States for jus
cogens violations is the United States.55 As the Court in Ferrini admitted, this example is not entirely
instructive given the restrictive and politically motivated conditions placed on this revocation of
immunity.56 Moreover, the national legislation of a single State does not constitute the uniform and
universal practice of States that would be indicative of consensus on the issue.57 Although “State
practice is insufficient to support” a jus cogens exception to State immunity this merely indicates
“States do not recognize an obligation to make such an exception, and not necessarily that they do not
consider themselves entitled to do so.”58

ii. Secondary Sources
Secondary sources such as legal opinions and the writings of scholars are mixed on the question of
abrogating State immunity for jus cogens violations. The European Court of Human Rights’ main dissenting
opinion in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom59 has received much attention by proponents of the revocation of
State immunity for violations of jus cogens as the Al-Adsani dissenters concluded that in the event of a
conflict between jus cogens and State immunity, jus cogens should predominate and immunity should be
superseded.60 However, it was only a dissenting opinion. Documents regarding State immunity produced by
the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association do not contain any provisions for
violations of jus cogens.61 Finally, academic sources seem to be evenly split on the question.62
From this survey of the traditional sources of international law, the Ferrini doctrine does seem far
afield of international law as it currently stands. However, international law is not static. If the Ferrini
doctrine can be shown to have a logical basis, in addition to its strong moral appeal, it is quite possible
that Ferrini and its progeny constitute the first step in the process of significant changes in international
law which will have wide-ranging implications for State immunity especially for actions taken during
wartime.

55

56
57
58
59

60
61

62

Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round Two: The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al.
v.
Greece
and
Germany
Decision,
4
GERMAN
L.J.
478,
478-83
(2003),
available
at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No05/PDF_vol_04_no_05_477-491_european_bartsch_elberling.pdf.
See, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (“A foreign state shall not be immune . . . for personal injury or death that was caused by an act
of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an
act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.”); Notably, although U.S. courts may have
jurisdiction over the State, for the most part the assets of the State are still protected from attachment in execution of any
judgment; See generally, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1611.
Ferrini supra note 1, at ¶ 10.2.
Giegerich, supra note 54, at 203, 216.
Id.
Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). In Al-Adsani a dual British and Kuwaiti citizen alleged he
was tortured on orders of the Kuwaiti Government. He brought suit in English court asserting damages. However, when the
English courts held that Kuwait was entitled to immunity Al-Adsani filed suit against the United Kingdom in the European
Court of Human Rights on the grounds that by affording Kuwait immunity the United Kingdom failed to protect his right
against being tortured and having access to the courts in violation of the European Human Rights Convention.
Id. Dissent ¶ 3.
Resolution of L’Institut de Droit International on Contemporary Problems Concerning the Immunity of States in Relation to
Questions of Jurisdiction & Enforcement (Basle, September 2, 1991), reprinted in ANDREW DICKINSON ET AL., STATE
IMMUNITY 206 (2004), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1991_bal_03_fr.PDF (French); International Law
Association Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity (Buenos Aires, August 14-20, 1994).
Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got it Wrong, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L.
955, 964 (2007) (discussing differing views on violations for jus cogens).
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B. THE NATURE OF STATE IMMUNITY
For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that State immunity is a rule of customary international
law and not a matter of discretion. However, it is instructive to briefly inquire into the nature of State
immunity. Is it really an obligation of customary international law? If so, then there are two propositions
involved: (1) State immunity is a rule of law not executive discretion; and (2) State immunity is a universal
rule of international law, not subject to municipal variations.63 While State immunity “is generally recognized
by States” there is an “alternative school of thought” which holds that State immunity is within the
discretionary authority of a State’s executive branch unless such immunity is manifested in legislation.64
Recent rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court may indicate that it follows this alternative school of
thought—regarding State immunity as purely a matter of executive discretion.65 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
view is puzzling since the legislative history of the FSIA demonstrates that a primary purpose of the legislation
was to adopt a set standard in order to avoid ad hoc, case-by-case determinations of immunity.66 Nevertheless,
in Republic of Austria v. Altman,67 the Court held that the anti-retroactivity doctrine did not bar the FSIA from
applying retroactively because, inter alia, such application would not alter the legal rights of States but rather
would only alter political protection the United States may, in its discretion extend to other States.68 Altman is
thus, arguably indicative of the U.S. Supreme Court’s current view of State immunity.69
The theory of reciprocity may tend to support the discretionary characterization of State immunity.70 If
a State will only recognize the immunity of those States that afford it immunity then surely this is indicative
of a discretionary principle. However, the principle of State immunity is increasingly included in
international conventions and national legislation with the consequence that any power of the executive over
the recognition of State immunity is greatly curtailed.71 Additionally, the increasing recognition that access
to courts is a human right72 also serves to limit courts in their recognition of State immunity if it “has no
legitimate aim and is disproportionate.”73

63
64
65

66

67
68
69
70
71
72

73

HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 13 (2008).
Id.
Beaty v. Iraq, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2194 (2009) (State immunity is a reflection of present political realties and is not something
upon which States can rely in their dealings with each other); Republic of Austria v. Altman, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004) (State
immunity is the product of political realities and courts have historically deferred to the decisions of the political branches of
government on questions of State immunity); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (State immunity is “a
gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns”).
The Revised State-Justice Bill On Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The Time For Action: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov’t. Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 33–35 (1976) (statement of
Monroe Leigh, State Department Legal Adviser, that FSIA would alleviate the burden of having to make decisions of State
immunity on a case-by-case basis); Charles T. Main Int’l Inc., v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 813 (C.A.
Mass. 1981) (“one objective of FSIA…was to end the practice whereby the State Department was expected to file, on a caseby-case basis, ‘suggestions of immunity,’ to which the courts would normally defer.”).
Altman, 541 U.S. at 677.
Id. at 696.
FOX, supra, note 63, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) (“Each State
Party to the present Convention undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.”); Euro. Consult. Ass., European Convention on Human Rights, 6th Sess., art. 6(1) (1950) (“In the determination of
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”) (Emphasis added).
FOX, supra note 63, at 16.
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Although the absence of protest by a State whose immunity has been abrogated by a national court of
another State may support the notion that State immunity is discretionary, such an inference is
“questionable.”74 This is because a protest is “implicit and is made by a refusal to appear.”75 Additionally,
“the instances of protest or acquiescence are motivated by considerations too various to support immunity as
either a rule of law or a discretionary privilege.”76
Aside from the United States, all other civil and common law jurisdictions have rejected State
immunity as a mere “gesture of comity.”77 Even the controversial Ferrini decision acknowledged that
State immunity is a rule of international law.78 Moreover, it is likely that once the United Nations
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property comes into force it will further
undermine the alternative school of thought which regards State immunity as a matter of executive
discretion.79 Indeed, the chapeau of the Convention (although non-binding) expressly provides that “the
jurisdictional immunities of States and their property are generally accepted as a principle of customary
international law.”80 Thus, proceeding with the assumption that State immunity is a rule of international
law, what is its position with regard to other rules of international law?
C. INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHY
That there is a hierarchy with respect to rules of customary international law has been recognized by
international bodies.81 Moreover, that jus cogens or peremptory norms trump those lower in the hierarchical
scheme has also been recognized by international bodies. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia82 referring to the prohibition on torture concluded that:
Because of the importance of the values it protects . . . a peremptory norm or jus cogens, [] is, a
norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’
customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that the principle at
issue cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties or local or special customs
or even general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.83
Similarly, under Article 41 of the Draft Articles, States are prohibited from recognizing the lawfulness
of a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law and may not
“render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”84 Upholding the immunity of a State that has violated
74
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99 AM. J. INT’L 242 (2005).
FOX, supra note 63, at 19.
G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38, Annex (Dec. 2, 2004).
Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th
Sess., May 1íJune 9, July 3íAug. 11, 2006, ¶ 251(6), U.N. Doc. A/61/10, Supp. No. 10 (2006), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report.htm.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s charter contains a mandate that the Tribunal only apply
customary international law. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has the same mandate. Thus, the law underlying
the decisions of these tribunals is regarded as an authoritative source of customary international law. See Doe v. Exxon, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, *60 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011) (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611 n.40 (2006); Abagninin
v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2008); Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17, Judgment, ¶ 153 (Dec. 10, 1998) (footnotes omitted).
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 56th Sess., Apr.
23íJune 1, July 2íAug. 10, 2001, art. 41(2), U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Supp. No. 10 (2001) (“No State shall recognize as lawful a
situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40 [peremptory norm of general international law], nor
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”).

THE FERRINI DOCTRINE

13

a peremptory norm arguably assists in maintaining the volatile situation since immunity is often a green light
for impunity. This would be true even if the recognition of immunity took place years or even decades after
the event since during the violation the State would be confident that its actions were immunized. Thus,
while upholding State immunity may not itself be a violation of jus cogens, it becomes a violation to the
extent that recognition of immunity assists in allowing the violation to continue85 which, pursuant to Article
41, a State has a duty, in cooperation with other States, to bring to an end.86
It would seem that the abrogation of State immunity to allow for civil suits is arguably permitted under
the Draft Articles. As discussed above, Article 41 precludes a State from recognizing a situation arising from
a serious breach of a peremptory norm and prohibits a State from rendering assistance to the maintenance of
such a situation. Upholding State immunity would arguably do both and therefore, is prohibited. Moreover,
under Article 48 even a State that has not been directly injured may invoke the responsibility of the
offending State if the obligation violated was “owed to the international community as a whole.”87 Thus, to
the extent that the Ferrini doctrine were only to apply to violations of jus cogens norms that also constitute
erga omnes obligations, the doctrine’s application would comport with Article 48 even if the State invoking
the doctrine was not the directly injured State. Moreover, under Article 48, the State invoking the violator’s
responsibility can demand reparations “in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached.”88 The Ferrini doctrine would simply allow the forum for such reparations to be the
domestic courts of the vindicating State.
However, there are at least two reasons why reliance on the Draft Articles in support of the Ferrini
doctrine may be misplaced. First, under both Articles 48 and 54, a non-injured State entitled under to
invoke the responsibility of the offending State may only take “lawful measures against that State to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of
the obligation breached.”89 Technically, Ferrini’s abrogation of State immunity is not lawful under
international law. Second, the Draft Articles may have been intended to apply on a strictly State-to-State
level.90 Even assuming arguendo that abrogation of State immunity for violations of peremptory norms is
lawful i.e., in compliance with the hierarchy of norms in international law, it is possible that Article 54
still precludes the Draft Articles from being a source of support for the Ferrini doctrine.
Article 54 refers to “reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached.”91 But, Article 54 ties back to Article 48, which allows for action by a non-injured
State for violations of peremptory norms owed to all States, i.e., erga omnes obligations.92 Thus, the
beneficiaries of the reparations sought are States not individuals. Indeed, the examples of such lawful
measures contained in the Commentary to Article 54 are all collective actions by States and refer to “the
protection of the collective interest.”93 Specifically with respect reparations, the Commentary avers that
actions taken under Article 48 are to be done “in the interest of the injured States, if any, or of the
85
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Orakhelashvili, supra note 62, at 964, 967.
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Commentaries to the draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts, 56th Sess., Apr. 23íJune 1, July 2íAug. 10, 2001, art. 41(1), U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Supp. No. 10 (2001) (“States shall
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article 40 [peremptory norm of
general international law].”) [Hereinafter Commentaries].
Id. art. 48(1)(b).
Id. art. 48(2)(b).
Id. art. 54.
The failure of the Draft Articles to provide standing to non-governmental organizations or other non-state actors in the context
of invoking State responsibility suggests that the Draft Articles were intended to apply strictly State-to-State. See, e.g., Marjan
Ajevski, Serious Breaches, The Draft Articles on State Responsibility and Universal Jurisdiction, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 12
(2008), available at http://www.ejls.eu/4/51UK.htm (arguing that failure to give NGOs and non-state actors standing ignores
an important development in the field of international law).
Commentaries, supra note 86, art. 54.
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 54 §§ 3-4, 6-7.
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beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”94 Once again, the action is justified only insofar as “it
provides a means of protecting the community or collective interest at stake.”95 This strongly indicates
that States rather than individuals are the concern of the Draft Articles. It would be a challenge to
explain how abrogating State immunity to permit private civil suits benefits the collective interest of
States96 because allowing civil suits by individuals against a violator State facilitates reparation in the
interest of those individuals rather than the State. Nevertheless, relying on the Draft Articles for direct
support of the Ferrini doctrine is tenuous at best even though the Draft Articles, like the Ferrini
doctrine, are premised on a hierarchy of international law.
International legal scholar Hazel Fox has serious concerns about the hierarchical approach to
international law whereby jus cogens rules prevail over State immunity. In a rhetorical examination of such
a proposition, Fox observes:
A jus cogens norm is said to invalidate or render ineffective other rules of international law.
Is this effect solely with regard to rules, which directly contradict the substantive law
contained in the superior norm? […] State immunity is a procedural rule going to the
jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a
prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different
method settlement.97
Fox cites the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) decision in Congo v. Rwanda as well as the House
of Lords’ decision in Jones v. Saudi Arabia in support of the proposition that such a hierarchy between jus
cogens and State immunity does not exist.98 The ICJ held that:
‘the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different
things’, and that the mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute
would not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. The same applies to the
relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and the
establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction: the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm
having such a character . . . cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to
entertain that dispute.99
Applying this precedent the House of Lords concluded that, “The International Court of Justice has
made plain that a breach of a jus cogens norm of international law does not suffice to confer jurisdiction.”100
International legal scholar Andrea Gattini summarizes the argument of scholars who favor the denial of
State immunity for violations of jus cogens or erga omnes obligations as follows: “peremptory norms, such
as those protecting human rights, prevail over ‘simple’ customary rules, such as that granting state
immunity; no legal effects can be therefore attached to acts which are null and void because of their
inconsistency with peremptory norms.”101 Gattini characterizes this argument as an oversimplification of
international law, which is neither logically sound nor practicable. That jus cogens do not take precedence
over State immunity is not an example of incongruity in international law because, Gattini posits, access to
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Id. art. 48 § 12(emphasis added).
Id. art. 48 § 12 (emphasis added).
However, the argument could be made that the possibility of such suit may, in some cases, serve as a deterrent, which arguably
benefits the collective interest. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 62, at 956.
FOX, supra note 63, at 151.
Id. at 155 (citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) and
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, (June 14)).
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 64 (Feb. 3).
FOX, supra note 63, at 155 (quoting Lord Bingham in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 24 (June 14)).
Andrea Gattini, War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 224, 234-235 (2005).
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justice is not a jus cogens norm nor does a violation of jus cogens carry a right to civil redress.102 According
to Gattini, “there is no evidence in international practice, or logical necessity, for the loss of state immunity
to ensue” as a result of a State’s violation of a peremptory norm.103 Neither does Gattini view Article 41 of
the Draft Articles as requiring such an outcome. A State’s duty to not recognize the legality of a situation
created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law would, in Gattini’s opinion, refer only
to a “continuing violation” and moreover, the refusal to abrogate State immunity is not tantamount to
“toleration or condonation of a peremptory international law norm.”104 Rather, such a refusal is simply the
expression of the belief that domestic judiciaries are not the proper forum to address such matters.105
A problem underlying the Italian Court of Cassation’s cases applying and expanding upon the Ferrini
doctrine is the Court is not clear as to whether only jus cogens norms or some undefined set of fundamental
principles are hierarchically superior to other international law rules such as State immunity.106 International
legal scholar Carlo Focarelli contends that the ease with which the Court moves between rules and values
demands scrutiny.107 In order for a value to have legal force, Focarelli wants the Court to demonstrate: (1)
the value the Court contends underlies the rule actually does underlie the rule; (2) what makes this value
have legal effect; (3) why these legal effects can trump existent legal rules; and (3) why these legal effects
alter the “standard operation” of State immunity.108 Indeed, the fact that in general, States regard the “norms
concerning international crimes as peremptory” yet still allow State immunity in the face of allegations of
international crimes “may well denote . . . that states do not ascribe the power to deny state immunity to the
peremptory character of these norms.”109 While the Court found it incongruous that State immunity is denied
for jure gestionis actions under the “commercial exception” but upheld for actions by States that constitute
international crimes, Focarelli argues that under international law, what is important is that “the generality of
states supports the former exception but not the latter.”110 Furthermore, Focarelli notes that the Court’s
values reasoning is a decidedly new innovation given that until the Ferrini decision, Italy was part of the
generality of States adhering to what the Court now contends is an “incongruous” approach to State
immunity.111
Perhaps the Italian Court of Cassation simply recognized that a new perspective is required. Courts’
reliance on the old justifications for State immunity artificially elevates the status of such immunity and
precludes fresh considerations of the principles that underlie it.112 For example, State immunity is connected
with notions of State sovereignty and if this is the case then the concept of State immunity should develop
and evolve just as the concept of State sovereignty has.113 As international legal scholar Lorna McGregor
argues, adhering to a concept of State immunity from the 17th century anachronistically places States above
the law—a position entirely inconsistent with the current framework of international law.114 Similarly, the
principle of parem non habet jurisdictionem115 has no place in the context of international crimes which
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Id. at 236-37; see also Giegerich, supra note 54, at 227 (noting that jus cogens and State immunity are directly contradictory
only if “victims of the jus cogens violations are entitled to an effective remedy in the courts of another State,” which is a
“dubious” proposition).
Gattini, supra note 101, at 236.
Id.
Id.
Focarelli, supra note 46, at 128.
Id.; see also Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court
Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, 100 (2005) (noting the Ferrini Court’s preoccupation with values).
Focarelli, supra note 46, at 128–29.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 912
(2008).
Id. at 915-16.
Id. at 916.
Concept that a State could not be forced to be a party to in the domestic courts of another State.
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have been recognized as impacting all States such that “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection.”116 Moreover, McGregor contends, at this point in history, it does not offend the dignity of a
State to be subject to the rule of law but rather, submission to the rule of law enhances the dignity of a
State.117 Nevertheless, State immunity continues to preclude many suits against States.

i. Dichotomies
In order to explore some of the reasons why States are treated differently imagine a violation of
fundamental human rights has occurred, torture for example. Under existing customary international law,
State immunity which extends to agents of the State acting in their official capacity and within the scope of
their duties, called functional immunity, can be abrogated leaving these officials subject to both criminal
prosecution and civil suit.118 However, under existing customary international law, the State itself retains its
immunity from suit.119 The retention of State immunity could possibly be justified under at least three
different dichotomies.
A. PROCEDURE/SUBSTANCE

Some courts appear to justify recognition of State immunity on the dichotomy between substance (jus
cogens) and procedure (immunity). Under this reasoning immunity concerns procedure, i.e., what forum is
competent to hear the claim, not substantive immunity, i.e., whether there is a cause of action at all. Thus,
when a court invokes State immunity as the basis for dismissing a claim against a foreign State this is
jurisdictional not substantive.
McGregor aims to undermine the justifications for upholding State immunity for States alleged to have
engaged in jus cogens violations such as torture.120 Three seminal cases upholding State immunity in the
face of torture allegations from the ICJ,121 the European Court of Human Rights,122 and the British House of
Lords123 all employed what McGregor contends is a false distinction between procedure and substance.124 In
essence, these courts asserted that State immunity from jurisdiction is simply a procedural bar, which does
not have any impact on the substance of the legal claim.125 If this is the case then, as the House of Lords
averred, State immunity “does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts
any breach of it to a different method of settlement.”126 However, as McGregor points out, this incorrectly
assumes that there is another viable forum to bring these claims.127 Consequently, jurisdictional immunity
116
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McGregor, supra note 112, at 916 (quoting Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 199, ¶ 155 (Jul. 9) (citing Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited,
Second Phase, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5))).
McGregor, supra note 112, at 917.
Hazel Fox, State Immunity and the International Crime of Torture, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 142, 143-44 (2006).
Id.
McGregor, supra note 112, at 906.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 60 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf (“Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quire
separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive
law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the
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Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 48 (2001) (asserting that “[t]he grant of [State] immunity is to be
seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts’ power to determine the right.”).
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 (June 14).
McGregor, supra note 112, at 906-07.
Id. at 907.
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 ¶ 24 (June 14).
McGregor, supra note 112, at 908; see also Christopher Keith Hall, The Duty of States Party to the Convention Against
Torture to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L.
921 (2008), available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/5/246.pdf (regarding the possibility of an affirmative right to redress
under Article 14 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
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becomes substantive immunity because realistically the domestic fora of the offending State are unlikely to
either allow the suit or provide a fair hearing.
When redress within the State where the jus cogens violation occurred is not available discretionary
diplomatic protection is far from promising.128 Diplomatic protection, under which a State agrees to pursue
an individual’s claim, is not a comparable substitute given that the decision to pursue the claim is at the sole
discretion of the State and foreign policy concerns monopolize the State’s considerations.129 Not only does
the individual have no right to diplomatic protection but even if diplomatic protection is used to pursue the
claim, the individual has no entitlement to any damages collected.130 In essence, the individual’s claim
becomes that of the State and thus, the State is under no obligation to pay the individual from any damages
the State is able to collect.
Arguably then, in such a milieu the recognition of State immunity despite allegations of jus cogens
violations is tantamount to a free pass and likely “contributes to, justifies, and may even constitute the
resulting impunity.”131 Moreover, casting State immunity as a procedural rule is a false construct of
neutrality which serves only “to steer attention away from the deeper question of the legitimacy of
immunity.”132 Quite simply, “procedural rules cannot be used to evade substantive obligations, as this would
defeat the core basis for jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of torture, by facilitating unlawful
derogation.”133
B. STATE/INDIVIDUAL

Arguably, if a norm such as the prohibition on torture has achieved exalted status as a peremptory norm
it seems illogical to abrogate traditional rules of State immunity to allow criminal and civil suits to proceed
against State officials but disallow the abrogation of traditional rules of State immunity to allow such suits
against the State itself. However, a crucial difference may lie in the fact that the functional immunity of
State officials is abrogated for criminal suits and such suits proceed against the officials as individuals
whereas State immunity for the State itself is still maintained despite the criminal suit against the State’s
agents.
International legal scholars Pasquale De Sena and Francesca De Vittor take a critical look at the
Italian Court of Cassation’s apparent approval of the notion that abrogation of State immunity is a
logical extension of the trend toward abrogating the “functional immunity” of State officials who
commit international crimes.134 De Sena and De Vittor conclude that the Court was far afield of
traditional jurisprudence in this perspective since “the question of sovereign immunity tends to be kept
well apart from the question of individual responsibility for international crimes.”135 Gattini expands on
this point by asserting that the trend toward stripping immunity from State officials who violate
international law does not logically lead to stripping the immunity of the States themselves.136 This is
because the punitive aspect of criminal law is “ill suited for states” which would lead to confusion and
uncertainty.137
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Punishment, Hall argues that such a right to redress exists despite the recent decisions of Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran
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McGregor, supra note 112, at 908.
Id. at 909-10.
Id. at 910-11.
Id. at 911; accord Orakhelashvili, supra note 62, at 957 (“Impunity is the implication of the deprivation of the only available
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Id. at 912.
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Gattini, supra note 101, at 239.
Id.
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Fox asserts that the purpose of State immunity is to channel prosecution of claims “to the courts of the
state in whose service the officials act or on whose behalf the transaction was performed.”138 However, Fox
notes that the differentiation between the actions of individual officials acting on behalf of the State and
actions of the State itself has facilitated the erosion of the broader concept of State immunity139 evidenced by
the fact that individuals may be held liable under international law for violations of human rights.140
Nevertheless, international law does not recognize the capacity of a State to commit crimes.141 Remedy for
aberrant State action is through a State-to-State system of “restitution and reparation.”142
Nevertheless, while criminal responsibility for States is admittedly problematic the Ferrini doctrine
addresses civil liability not criminal. Indeed, States have already agreed to forgo their immunity and be subject to
civil proceedings with resulting damage awards in high-stakes contexts such as investor-State arbitration. Setting
aside for a moment the neutral international fora in which such proceedings take place, the practice indicates that
the civil legal process is capable of fairly straight-forward transfer and application to suits against States.
Moreover, if the actions, torture or war crimes for example, violate jus cogens then the individual/State
distinction is arguably dispelled because such violations “cannot constitute acts jure imperii, or acts of
sovereignty.”143 In other words, because violations of jus cogens cannot constitute sovereign acts the State
does not enjoy immunity for such acts and is thus no different than an individual committing such acts.
However, the argument that State immunity in either case “must be rejected as necessarily leading to
impunity” since victims “have no other option to vindicate their rights” does not necessarily follow.144 Even
assuming redress is not possible in the fora of the violating State, abrogation of functional immunity of State
officials both in the criminal and civil context allows victims to vindicate their rights. Thus, from a logical
standpoint if violations of jus cogens do not constitute sovereign acts the State itself does not enjoy
immunity for such actions. However, as will be discussed infra, as a practical matter it is unclear why it
would be necessary or even advantageous for the State to be held liable when State officials are subject to
both civil and criminal legal processes.
C. CIVIL/CRIMINAL

Nevertheless, the distinction between criminal and civil suits may hold yet another reason for different
rules when it comes to State immunity. The civil/criminal distinction is one recognized by the House of
Lords in the majority opinion in Al-Adsani. In Al-Adsani the House of Lords attempted to further distinguish
the procedural versus substantive effects of a jus cogens violation in terms of whether the proceeding was
criminal or civil:
While the Court accepts, on the basis of these authorities, that the prohibition of torture has achieved
the status of a peremptory norm in international law, it observes that the present case concerns not . . .
the criminal liability of an individual for alleged acts of torture, but the immunity of a State in a civil
suit for damages in respect of acts of torture within the territory of that State. Notwithstanding the
special character of the prohibition of torture in international law, the Court is unable to discern in the
international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding
that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of
another State where acts of torture are alleged.145
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However, what this purported dichotomy fails to explain is why substance (jus cogens) trumps
procedure (immunity) in criminal cases but not civil.146 Indeed, the joint dissent refutes the majority’s
distinction between criminal and civil proceedings as a false one:
It is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has upon
another rule of international law, but the character of the rule as a peremptory norm and its
interaction with a hierarchically lower rule. The prohibition on torture, being a rule of jus cogens,
acts in the international sphere and deprives the rule of sovereign immunity of all its legal effects
in that sphere. The criminal or civil nature of the domestic proceedings is immaterial.147
The Al-Adsani dissent’s approach appears to be in-line with the reasoning employed by the Court of
Cassation in Ferrini and its progeny.
Setting aside the practical obstacles to holding a State criminally liable, as a logical matter, that a
violation of a jus cogens norm, such as the prohibition on torture, would justify the abrogation of traditional
rules of State immunity for criminal proceedings makes sense because as a peremptory norm, its violation
undermines the safety of all people. Conversely, permitting civil suits against the State for such violations
would permit only certain individuals to reap material benefit from a harm that has affected all people.148 In
short, civil suits serve too limited a purpose, whereas criminal prosecution benefits all people.
Criminal prosecution represents condemnation at a State-level, with the State holding the wrongdoer
accountable for harm done to society. If, as proposed below, the Ferrini doctrine—a civil remedy—would
be applicable only to violations of jus cogens that also constitute erga omnes obligations, since global harm
is the reason for abrogating State immunity there should be global benefit. Granted, the existence of a
criminal remedy is not mutually exclusive with the existence of a civil one. For example, under the U.S.
system, victims of crime are able to pursue civil cases against alleged wrongdoers even if the putative
defendants had been found innocent in a criminal case.149 However, as a practical matter, given existing
customary international law against State criminal responsibility, there would only be a civil remedy for jus
cogens violations meaning that only a select group of individuals would recover for a harm that is regarded
as so grave because of its impact on all people. As discussed above, States qua States cannot be held
criminally liable under international law. Because there is not, as yet, any principled means to impose
criminal liability on a State only a limited number of individuals would benefit even though the very basis
for the cause of action is due to the universality of the harm. In short, it would be ironic and incongruous to
extend a novel cause of action in a novel forum for the exclusive benefit of a select group of people for a
harm that has been done to the whole world. However, this is arguably a normative policy consideration.
Thus, as a logical matter, there is no reason why the criminal/civil nature of the putative proceedings against
a State should be dispositive as to the existence of State immunity for jus cogens violations.

ii. Conclusion on Dichotomies
The joint dissent in Al-Adsani considered the possible dichotomies discussed above and dismisses them
in favor of a straight-forward rule derived from systematic reasoning—State immunity is simply abrogated
when it comes to jus cogens violations. The joint dissent contended that the failure of the Al-Adsani majority
to reach this conclusion is the result of faulty reasoning. First, the majority accepted that the prohibition on
torture is a jus cogens rule.150 Thus, as any jus cogens rule, “it is hierarchically higher than any other rule of
146
147
148

149
150

Orakhelashvili, supra note 62, at 965.
Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶113 (2001) (Rozakis, Caflisch, Js., dissenting).
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international law” such that in the event a jus cogens rule conflicts with a rule that does not have jus cogens
status, the jus cogens rule prevails and renders the conflicting rule “null and void.”151 Second, the majority
did not deny that State immunity is not a jus cogens rule.152 Consequently, “the jus cogens nature of the
prohibition of torture entails that a State allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in
this case, those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the illegality of its actions.”153 Without
disputing the majority’s characterization of State immunity as a “procedural bar” the dissent averred that in
the face of a jus cogens rule, “the procedural bar of State immunity is automatically lifted, because those
rules, as they conflict with a hierarchically higher rule, do not produce any legal effect.”154 Quite simply,
State immunity is entirely inapplicable in cases of jus cogens violations regardless of the variety of
dichotomies that could possibly be drawn in an attempt to preclude such a result. Thus, assuming there is a
hierarchy of international law, as a matter of logical reasoning there is no principled reason why State
immunity should stand in the face of jus cogens violations.
Notably, an authoritative statement on just where the state of international law is with respect to
this issue has been made. The FRG filed in the ICJ seeking a declaration that the decisions in Italian
cases such as Ferrini and Civitella violate international law and consequently, Italy must take action to
ensure such judgments are unenforceable and that such suits will not be entertained in the future.155
When this article was initially penned the case was still pending. However, on February 3, 2012 the ICJ
handed down the perhaps unsurprising decision which concluded that “under customary international
law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of
serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict.”156
Nevertheless, the decision does not render the Ferrini Doctrine moot. Indeed, the ICJ’s conclusion itself
contains the operative language—“customary international law as it presently stands.”157 As previously
discussed, customary international law is not static and Ferrini and its progeny may very well continue
to influence the contours of this evolving body of law.
D. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Court in Civitella was concerned that if sovereign immunity were upheld despite violations by the
State of fundamental human rights, individuals would be precluded from bringing suit and human rights
would not be effectively protected.158 Thus, the Court concluded that individuals must be given access to the
courts to seek compensation for damages suffered as a result of fundamental human rights violations.159 But
even assuming that State immunity is inapplicable in cases of jus cogens violations, a tribunal entertaining a
claim must still assert some basis of jurisdiction over the State. However, the Court in Civitella was not clear
on the basis of jurisdiction for such suits. Like in Ferrini, the Court analogized to universal jurisdiction for
international criminal cases.160
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In short, the argument is that jus cogens norms take precedence over “the non-mandatory
customary international rule” of State immunity.161 The universal jurisdiction argument included in this
approach appears to be supported by Article 14 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which conspicuously omits any territorial
limitation when it declares that States Parties must have a civil remedy for victims of torture.162
However, the United States explicitly stated upon its ratification of the Convention that it read Article
14 to only require States Parties to have a civil remedy for acts of torture committed in territories under
its own jurisdiction.163 Such a reading was rejected by the ICJ which held that “[T]he rights and
obligations enshrined in the Convention [Against Torture] are rights and obligations erga omnes. The
Court notes that the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not
territorially limited by the Convention.”164 This supports the proposition that the predominant basis of
jurisdiction, i.e., territoriality, might not limit jurisdiction when it comes to erga omnes obligations, at
least when the applicable convention is silent or ambiguous. However, this holding does not necessarily
mean States can exercise universal jurisdiction over erga omnes obligations—it is likely that some
nexus with the forum State is required. Indeed, even an attempt to analogize and extend universal
criminal jurisdiction under the Resolution on Criminal Jurisdiction adopted by the Institut de Droit
International is also problematic since such jurisdiction requires several prerequisites including
substantial connection with the forum State.165 Fox asserts that the Ferrini Court’s extension of the
exception to immunity for extraterritorial acts was based on the gravity of the violation but that the
Court’s “reasoning lacks legal precision” and abolishes the traditional distinction between individual
official actors and the State “more by reference to moral values than legal concepts.”166
Ferrini’s assertion of jurisdiction was somewhat shaky given the holding in Al-Adsani that the
abrogation of State immunity in civil suits based on torture that had occurred outside the forum State was
not yet generally accepted in international law.167 Ferrini attempted to distinguish Al-Adsani by noting that
the harm in Ferrini commenced in Italy—the forum State—when Ferrini was abducted from Italy in order to
be sent into forced labor in Germany.168 However, the Civitella case was much more straightforward. The
massacre that formed the basis for the suit occurred in Italy, the victims bringing suit were Italian citizens,
and Italy was the forum for the suit.169 Thus, the case fit squarely within the classic jurisdictional category of
locus commissi delicti.170 However, the Court did not cite such a basis for jurisdiction in its opinion. An
argument could be made that the failure to cite this basis for jurisdiction in combination with the analogy to
universal criminal jurisdiction indicates that “the Court did not intend to limit the principle of non-immunity
to breaches of human rights committed on the territory of the state of the forum.”171 However, as discussed
below, reliance on the traditional basis for jurisdiction, especially for such a novel new rule, is advisable.
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Pure universal jurisdictional is a powerful tool that when employed unilaterally by a State based on its
domestic legislation outside the implementing framework of an international treaty, is frowned upon.172
However, the ostensible conflict between jurisdiction and immunity may be the result of a faulty baseline.
According to McGregor, State immunity from suit in the domestic courts of another State was historically a
much more flexible concept—an exception to the forum’s jurisdiction—especially “in cases of torture and
crimes under international law.”173 Thus, by beginning an evaluation of a case with an inquiry into whether
State immunity precludes suit is erroneous. Rather, the forum needs to establish whether it has jurisdiction and
only after this has been established need it address the possible application of State immunity.174 International
legal scholar Thomas Giegerich appears to hold a similar view, citing the Lotus Principle175—under
international law what is not prohibited is permitted—to assert that there is a general right of every State to
adjudicate claims in its courts, even those involving extraterritorial events, subject to only a few limitations
imposed by international law.176 Traditionally, sovereign immunity has been one such limitation on the
territoriality principle.177 As such, the forum State would ostensibly bear the burden of proof for jurisdiction,
the respondent State would then bear of the burden of proof for sovereign immunity, and then the forum State
would bear the burden of proof for an exception to sovereign immunity.178 Giegerich finds this burden of proof
construct to be circular given that it rests “on two uncertain premises”—the broad jurisdiction of States over
extraterritorial events and broad State immunity subject only to limited exceptions.179 Since international law
is based on consensus, Giegerich points out that despite its weaknesses, the burden of proof construct is a
“pragmatic expedient” and absent a showing that a deviation from established international law has gained
universal acceptance, the general rules will continue to apply.180
Although it is not one of those general rules, those who would seek to revoke State immunity for
violations of jus cogens or erga omnes obligations often invoke universal civil jurisdiction.181 Such a
concept is not dissimilar from the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in U.S. law.182 However, even the ATS
recognizes State immunity—civil suits cannot be brought against States for violations of international
law.183 While Gattini does not dispute that an erga omnes obligation “endows every state with a legal
172
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interest for its respect” this legal interest is circumscribed to a certain form and content.184 Even though
there is a dearth of “relevant international practice,” Gattini implies that even in international law there
may very well need to be “a link between the forum state and the subject-matter.”185 However,
according to De Sena’s and De Vittor’s analysis of Ferrini, the fact that at least part of the plaintiff’s
injuries were sustained while he was in the forum State was neither dispositive nor controlling as to the
question of jurisdiction.186 Refutation of this type of jurisdictional nexus as a prerequisite was made
clear in Mantelli. What had greater bearing on jurisdiction was that the alleged wrongdoing constituted
“international crimes” and violated the “peremptory rule protecting human rights.”187
The invocation of international crimes carries with it the concept of universal criminal jurisdiction.
Gattini finds fault with the tendency to equate universal civil jurisdiction with universal criminal
jurisdiction. First, Gattini argues, “the principle of universal criminal jurisdiction is far from certain.”188
Second, with the exception of forum loci commissi delicti, the traditional grounds of criminal jurisdiction
differ markedly from those of civil jurisdiction.189 Third, universal criminal jurisdiction applies to
individuals and is not analogous to a proposed universal civil jurisdiction against States.190 Indeed, as a
preface to her discussion of universal jurisdiction, Fox points out that while all jus cogens norms are also
erga omnes obligations, not all erga omnes obligations are jus cogens norms.191 Although international
conventions relating to international crime impose obligations on States Parties to extradite alleged offenders
for prosecution in what is known as subsidiary universal jurisdiction or aut dedere aut judicare (prosecute or
extradite) jurisdiction, Fox asserts that “the existence of a wider universal jurisdiction to exercise an
obligation erga omnes over acts committed outside the territory of the forum State is of a controversial
nature and unsupported by custom.”192
However, those who support abrogation of immunity for jus cogens violations point to Article 41 of the
Draft Articles to assert that the obligation not to recognize the violation of a peremptory norm would be
defeated if immunity was afforded the offending State.193 Fox suggests the possibility that extraterritorial
jurisdiction could be exercised only when remedies within the offending State are refused or unavailable to
victims.194 Moreover, to avoid the “total judicial chaos” which would likely result unless such extraterritorial
jurisdiction is properly defined, Fox suggests that the forum State should be required to have a
“jurisdictional link” such as both the forum and respondent States being parties to the same international
conventions involving respect of human rights.195 While a jurisdictional link to the forum is not
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incompatible with a narrow reading of the Ferrini doctrine,196 the type of link suggested by Fox is
incompatible for at least two reasons. First, if the Ferrini doctrine is applicable for violations of jus cogens,
by definition these are peremptory norms binding on all States. Thus, whether or not a State is party to a
particular convention codifying that norm is irrelevant; the State is still bound. Second, predicating
jurisdiction upon adherence to a convention would import language and reasoning which were absent in the
decisions of the Court of Cassation. By simply giving Ferrini and its progeny a narrow reading a viable
principle emerges without artificial additives. As discussed infra, with respect to the question of jurisdiction,
a narrow reading of these cases results in a conventional approach to jurisdiction based on traditional
grounds recognized under international law, most notably territoriality and passive personality.
E. CONSEQUENCES
Allowing civil suits to proceed against a State for jus cogens violations is perhaps most problematic
from a practical consequences standpoint. Giegerich asserts that under the principle of sovereign immunity,
allowing civil suits for jus cogens violations would wreak havoc on international relations and “create a
judicial chaos of overlapping and contradictory claims to jurisdiction undermining the international rule of
law.”197
According to Giegerich, hierarchical preemption “would have intolerable consequences” not the least
of which would be the erosion of protection of diplomatic property from attachment in execution of a
judgment.198 Is this concern that the long-standing rule of immunity for diplomatic property would be swept
aside by the Ferrini doctrine justified? Even the United States, which under its amendments to the FSIA,
allows for civil suits against State sponsors of terrorism, has a clear policy against the attachment of
diplomatic property.199 Indeed, the U.S. Government itself often intervenes in cases to prevent such
attachment.200 Of course, the U.S. policy is arguably based not so much on principle rather than practical
reciprocity concerns given that the United States owns a considerable amount of prime real estate abroad as
part of its diplomatic missions. Logically however, if jus cogens violations are serious enough to abrogate
the lower rule of State immunity then it would also trump what is arguably a lower rule of immunity for
diplomatic property. Given the jealously with which States guard their diplomatic property, it is likely that
even if the Ferrini doctrine is accepted, States, out of reciprocity concerns, will continue to uphold immunity
of diplomatic property. Aside from diplomatic property, nationalized or majority nationally-owned
businesses with assets abroad could also be subject to attachment. If the State has sole or majority interest in
a business, it is often considered an instrumentality of the State and consequently would be vulnerable to
attachment for any judgments rendered against the State.201 Overall, despite these two possible targets of
attachment, claimants will be unlikely to recover even if there is a judgment in their favor.202 This angst over
a sea change with respect to diplomatic property or other State-owned assets is very likely unnecessary. And
moreover, as discussed infra, this inability to execute judgments is perhaps one of the most salient reasons
why, as a normative matter, the Ferrini doctrine is unsound.
The Ferrini doctrine is assailed by numerous other arguments citing the potential for negative
consequences. For example, it is likely that courts will be hugely disadvantaged in ascertaining the factual
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and legal issues involved given that respondent States will more than likely refuse to participate.203 As noted
above, and discussed further infra, execution of a judgment will likely be an uphill battle if not a quixotic
quest. While judgments can serve other functions such as publicizing atrocities or contributing to the
establishment of facts for the historical record these auxiliary goals of suit are not well achieved through a
default judgment.
Additionally, Giegerich sees the potential for serious disequilibrium within the system as only wealthy
and powerful States would have the resources and clout to serve as fora for such suits which “raises the
question of whether a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity really serves the international rule of law
or only the interests of powerful States.”204 This consequence would be somewhat limited if, as proposed
infra, those States adopting the Ferrini doctrine were required to apply it to all States equally not just a
select few like the United States does under the FSIA.
Finally, the prospect of individual suits with enormous amounts of damages would be an impediment
to “a comprehensive diplomatic solution which does justice to all the victims” of a particular jus cogens
violation.205 Indeed, De Sena and De Vittor aver that the Ferrini doctrine’s balancing between State
immunity and the protection of human rights in which human rights win206 carries with it two “inherent”
conclusions: (1) universal civil jurisdiction; and (2) no statutory limitation on damage.207 Without
elaboration they reason that these outcomes are the natural “consequences of the prevailing value recognized
in the protection of human rights.”208 Nevertheless, even if there is a flood of civil litigants seeking
enormous damages, payment of those judgments, absent a radical and unlikely change in the immunity laws
surrounding State property, is unlikely to be realized.
Not all scholars have such a negative assessment of the practical consequences of the Ferrini doctrine.
International legal scholar Annalisa Ciampi acknowledges that a major criticism of the Ferrini and Civitella
cases is that such decisions will open a floodgate of litigation.209 Citing five reasons, Ciampi flatly contends
that the risk of such a litigation onslaught occurring is vastly overblown.210 First, as noted above, the ability to
bring a civil suit against a foreign State and be awarded damages does not mean that recovery will be possible
given that the limitation on immunity from suit does not extend to immunity from attachment of assets.211
Thus, if judgments are unlikely to be satisfied, many potential plaintiffs may simply not file suit unless the
moral or emotional victory will be adequate compensation for the time and money invested in such a suit.
Second, the abrogation of State immunity is just one condition precedent of many to establish liability
of the State, not the least of which is jurisdiction. Ciampi notes that a jurisdictional nexus between the harm
and the forum State will likely be required since universal jurisdiction in civil cases is highly
controversial.212 Moreover, given the serious nature of the violations alleged the burden of proof even for a
civil case will likely be quite onerous.213
Third, an individual or private cause of action for such a suit must exist either at international law or at
international law as interpreted and applied in the forum State.214 States adopting the Ferrini doctrine would
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have to have domestic legislation creating a private right of action for jus cogens violations because
international conventions reflective of jus cogens norms do not explicitly confer such a right and have not
typically been interpreted as doing so.215
Fourth, there may be formal agreements between States, which preclude such suits entirely.216
However, whether such agreements will be effective at precluding suit is questionable. For example, in
Civitella, the FRG argued that Italy had waived its rights and the rights of its citizens to compensation from
Germany or German citizens for damages incurred during WWII under the Peace Treaty of February 10,
1947 and the Bonn Agreement of June 2, 1961 under which Italy waived the rights of itself and its citizens
to claim damages from the FRG for events occurring between September 1, 1939 and May 8, 1945.217 In
Civitella, the Court rejected this argument, interpreting the Peace Treaty not to apply to the FRG because it
not a party to the Treaty and because the Treaty applied only to material damages not emotional or moral
ones.218 Similarly, the Bonn Agreement did not preclude suit because it applied only to suits pending at the
time of the Agreement, not to those which began after the Agreement was executed.219
Finally, the international or forum State statutes of limitations may preclude suit.220 For example, Italy
has a five-year statute of limitations on tort claims, unless the tort also constitutes a crime in which case the
criminal statute of limitations for that crime would apply.221 Crimes for which the punishment is life
imprisonment have no statute of limitations.222 In Ferrini the plaintiffs were unable to recover because the
statute of limitations had already run on their claim.223 In Civitella, however, murder is punishable by life
imprisonment and consequently, no statute of limitations applied so the plaintiffs were not barred from
recovery.224 These five factors constitute considerable restraints holding back the floodgates of litigation. As
Ciampi concludes, “Lifting immunity is only one dimension of individuals’ attempts to obtain compensation
for international crimes in domestic courts.”225
The fear that abrogation of immunity will open the floodgates of litigation may also be exaggerated.
However, the argument that the threat of civil litigation may serve as a deterrent, at least for States with
attachable assets abroad, leading to fewer violations and consequently, less litigation226 is doubtful. Given
the serious nature of the violations for which suit would be permitted, the possibility of a civil suit judgment
giving the State pause is far-fetched. Such a prospect would be ludicrous to a State bent on genocide because
the State would not plan for any potential claimants to even survive. Moreover, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens can be used to deflect cases from national courts to the courts of another State or an international
forum.227 However, this assumes that these alternate fora actually exist. The States where the violations
allegedly occurred are unlikely to provide a forum and international bodies are not certain to take up the
case. Thus, these suits may end up in national courts after all.
Nevertheless, the Lozano decision may somewhat serve to quell the fear that the abrogation of State
immunity will open the floodgates of litigation. The Court of Cassation was very specific about the type of
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action, which would justify its assertion of jurisdiction in this case—war crimes.228 Moreover, the court gave
a narrow definition of what constitutes a war crime by limiting it to “grave breaches of international
humanitarian law of armed conflict” which are both intentional and part of a plan, policy, or “large-scale
commission of such crimes.”229 The Court’s holding in Lozano that only war crimes would justify
jurisdiction is compatible with the assertion of jurisdiction in Ferrini and Civitella since the causes of action
in those cases stemmed from actions which would constitute war crimes as defined in Lozano. Thus, from
these cases it is possible to hypothesize that there may be an objective substantive limitation on the type of
actions for which Italian Court of Cassation would exercise civil jurisdiction under its emerging jus cogens
exception to State immunity. However, such a limitation on the Ferrini doctrine, i.e., civil jurisdiction only
for war crimes, is arguably inconsistent with the Court’s assertion that a State’s immunity from civil suit in
the domestic courts of another State should be abrogated for international crimes because international
crimes include much more than war crimes.230 While, Ferrini, Lozano, and Civitella all involved actions that
constituted war crimes this does not necessarily mean the Court’s doctrine is thus limited, especially since
the decisions themselves seem to quite clearly intend a much broader purview under which domestic courts
could assert civil jurisdiction over a foreign State. However, as discussed infra, it is prudent to give these
decisions a narrow reading under which the Ferrini doctrine would be limited to war crimes that are welldefined under international law—to wit, grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions.
It is quite possible that, as some scholars contend, concerns that the abrogation of State immunity from
civil suit will have significant negative consequences are “more imaginary than real.”231 There may not even
be a marked decline in bilateral relations between States as the result of such suits. Indeed, the abrogation of
the FRG’s immunity in civil suits in Italian and Greek courts did not cause long-term irreparable damage to
bilateral relations between the States.232
Despite the existence or non-existence of such consequences, for proponents of the abrogation of State
immunity for jus cogens violations such concerns cannot be allowed to impact the assessment of the
hierarchy of norms—the lifeblood of the Ferrini decision and its progeny—because this hierarchy is “an
issue of legal science.”233 The question then becomes can Ferrini and its progeny be distilled into a doctrine
that in addition to its moral attractiveness also has a sound and reasoned legal basis?

III.

RULE FORMATION

Under the Italian Constitution, generally recognized norms of international law are fully applicable so
long as they do not breach the essential foundations of the Italian legal system, which includes the protection
of fundamental human rights.234 Italy is not a party to the Basel Convention on State Immunity nor is it a
party to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property.235
Moreover, Italy has no legislation on State immunity.236 Therefore, Italian courts must determine the
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See id., at 1084-1087 (Cassesse asserts that the Court confuses war crimes with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
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Art. 10 Costituzione ¶ 6 [Cost.] (It.).
The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property is not yet in force. United Nations
Treaty Collections, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY (2004),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/4_1_2004.pdf.
Ciampi, supra note 31, at 608.
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applicability of such immunity and are bound by the Constitution to consider generally recognized norms of
international law.237 The Court of Cassation’s decisions in Ferrini and its progeny represent a value-oriented
approach to reconciling State immunity and the protection of fundamental human rights, which are both
principles of international law.238
From their analysis, De Sena and De Vittor conclude that the Ferrini Court placed special emphasis on the
nature of the alleged wrongdoing.239 The Court’s willingness to use “international crimes” and “jus cogens”
interchangeably240 indicated to De Sena and De Vittor that the Court was advocating the abrogation of State
sovereignty whenever the wrongdoing was “contrary to universal values shared by the whole international
community” because “these values represent the fundamental principles of the international legal system.”241
According to De Sena and De Vittor, the Court’s decision was the incarnation of what had been an ethereal
academic legal theory—“the formal supremacy of the jus cogens norms gives them prevalence over all clashing
non-peremptory norms, and therefore also over norms concerning sovereign immunity.”242 However, as
Giegerich points out, only a select number of rules or principles “clearly belong in the jus cogens category” and it
is even more uncertain what the consequences would be for violating jus cogens.243 Furthermore, while there is
consensus that a State’s sovereign acts enjoy immunity, with some exceptions,244 there is not agreement as to
what constitutes a sovereign act nor as to what the exceptions are with regard to sovereign acts.245
This uncertainty in international law manifests itself in what Focarelli observes to be the Court’s
inconsistent reasoning. For example, according to the Court, the principle of State immunity and the
principle that international crimes pose a threat to all of humanity coexist in international law.246 When
conflict erupts between these principles, priority must be given to the “higher-ranking rules”—those relating
to international crimes. Given the gravity of these crimes, the Court inferred an exception to State
immunity.247 Although the Court acknowledged that there was no clear international custom abrogating civil
immunity of a State for such crimes, this did not mean that there was a custom of permitting such
immunity.248 According to Focarelli, this position is a precarious one, which serves to convolute the Court’s
reasoning.249 Under Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution, only “generally recognized” principles of
international law are applicable within the Italian legal system. Thus, if an exception to State immunity does
not yet enjoy customary status, it is not part and parcel of the Italian legal system and consequently, cannot
trump a principle that is, e.g., State immunity.250 However, by holding that this non-immunity rule trumps
State immunity the Court asserted that non-immunity for such crimes is in fact an established rule in direct
contradiction of its own admission a few lines earlier that such a rule was only emerging.251
Compounding the problem is the Court’s ambiguity as to the exact substantive grounds for
invocation of the Ferrini doctrine. The Court changes its vocabulary with regard to the offenses for
which State immunity from civil suit would be abrogated both within and across its decisions from
fundamental human rights violations to international crimes.252 Whether this is deliberate or the result of
laxity is not certain but it seems likely that the Court is desirous that a considerable expanse of offenses
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which would justify such abrogation. From a moral standpoint it is laudable that the Court desires to
extend the availability of effective redress for serious offenses. Conversely, from a legal standpoint the
fact remains that the Court is in essence a rogue actor eschewing established international law in an
attempt to expound a new rule.
Nevertheless, the Ferrini doctrine can be saved by simply narrowing the Court’s reasoning to its core
and requiring a more precise articulation of the rule. Ferrini and its progeny all involved incidents that
occurred during war.253 This is no aberration. Indeed, the abrogation of State immunity pursuant to the
Ferrini doctrine as originally annunciated in Ferrini is most likely to come up in the context of war and, as
discussed below, under a narrow reading of the Ferrini line of cases the only context in which such
abrogation could arise.
The Ferrini doctrine will be most successful if its application is as straightforward as possible both
in applicability and substance. This entails two propositions. First, abrogation of State immunity under
the Ferrini doctrine should be applicable to all States or none. Each State can choose whether it will
accept the Ferrini doctrine254 but if it does then it must be applied to all States—no picking and
choosing reminiscent of the United States under the FSIA. Second, the Ferrini doctrine, at least for now,
must only apply to grave breaches of international humanitarian law as provided in the four Geneva
Conventions. This substantive limitation reflects the narrowest reading of the Ferrini line of cases.
Moreover, the four Geneva Conventions enjoy universal acceptance and their principles constitute jus
cogens that are also erga omnes obligations.255
This proposal limiting applicability and substance are interrelated and stem from the fact that the
players in international law are States.256 Under the narrowest reading of the Ferrini line of cases abrogation
of State immunity is based on violation of a jus cogens norm that is an erga omnes obligation.257 The duty to
abide by a jus cogens norm is a duty of a State and that duty is owed to all States—not individuals.258 Thus,
as the duty owed to all States has been violated each State may decide for itself what the consequences will
be for the violating State. However, a foundational principle of international law is the equality of States.
Thus, there should be equality between States when it comes to the consequences for an erga omnes
obligation. If a State chooses abrogation of State immunity from civil suit as a consequence it must apply
that consequence to all States that commit such a violation.
A. APPLICABILITY
Arguably, this all-or-nothing application would appear to undermine the argument that the Ferrini
doctrine does not threaten to open the floodgates of litigation because States can enter into agreements
precluding suit entirely. While such agreements would preclude a flood of litigation it would also
circumvent Ferrini’s all-or-nothing application thus allowing for politically motivated application as States
enter such agreements with their allies to the exclusion of their foes. However, as an initial matter, by
limiting the Ferrini doctrine’s application to grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions, the number of
potential cases is inherently limited to causes of action arising during an international armed conflict. And
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See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“International law itself . . . does not require any particular
reaction to violations of law . . . . Whether and how [a State] should react to such violations are domestic, political questions”)
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Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. 1970 I.C.J. 3.
This paper argues that the Ferrini doctrine has the potential to change the customary international law with respect to State
immunity not that individuals have a right to sue a State civilly. Indeed, to the extent that the Court of Cassation bases its
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Ferrini, supra note 1.
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although a sizable category, it is still much smaller than under a broad reading of the Ferrini doctrine, which
would make any violation of fundamental human rights potentially actionable. Moreover, if the Ferrini
doctrine is substantively limited to grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions, any such arrangement
precluding civil suit could be limited in a principled and reasoned way to formal peace treaties or settlement
agreements rather than allowing preclusion based on any bilateral or multilateral agreement.259 In fact, such
formal resolution is much more likely in the context of an international armed conflict.
Another argument against an all-or-nothing application of the Ferrini doctrine is that it takes away an
important foreign policy bargaining chip insofar as a State could not selectively abrogate State immunity on
an ad hoc political basis. While this is true, as a practical matter ad hoc abrogation of State immunity
arguably does more to drive a wedge between States rather than serve as a means of pressure for certain
desired behavior and ultimate rapprochement. For example, the United States has abrogated Iran’s immunity
from civil suit by deeming it a State-sponsor of terrorism.260 To date there are over fifty-two outstanding
judgments against Iran amounting to over $75 billion in compensatory and punitive damages.261 This
enormous amount in default judgments is a major obstacle to normalization of relations between the United
States and Iran.262 Thus, the loss of immunity as a bargaining chip may actually lead to more effective
foreign policy strategies.263 And of course, as a matter of realpolitik, if a State wants to make ad hoc
determinations as to State immunity it will do so. However, in order for the Ferrini doctrine to gain ground
as a principled approach to the issue of State immunity it must be articulated as an all-or-nothing standard
for the States who choose to adopt it.
B. SUBSTANCE
With regard to substance, this paper proposes that the Ferrini doctrine should be limited to its most
narrow holding, i.e., abrogating State immunity from civil suit in the domestic courts of another State only
for violations of international humanitarian law as reflected by grave breaches of the four Geneva
Conventions. This paper counsels against a broader reading of the Ferrini doctrine for at least two reasons.
First, the proposition that a State could non-consensually lose its immunity from civil suit in the domestic
courts of a foreign State for violations of international obligations is novel. Thus, any case or line of cases
purporting to do just that should be limited to their facts. Ferrini and its progeny all involved violations of
international humanitarian law that constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Thus, the
substantive grounds for abrogation of State immunity should be limited to such breaches. Indeed, the Court
in Lozano held that as the alleged conduct did not amount to a war crime the Court had no jurisdiction.264
Second, unlike other jus cogens norms that also constitute erga omnes obligations, grave breaches of the
four Geneva Conventions are universally accepted and any variations in their application and interpretation
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See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (mentioning that the United States cannot nullify the judgments without compensation because the
plaintiffs have a property interest in those judgments.) Cf. id. (noting that the 5th Amendment requires “just compensation.”)
Thus, if “just compensation” is fair market value, it is unlikely the fair market value of these judgments is their face value
given that there is no reasonable likelihood of every recovering anything let alone the face value. Thus, actually nullifying the
judgments may be a viable option for the United States Government insofar as the fair market value compensation for the
judgments would be little to nothing.
See In Re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, supra note 260 (noting that the State sponsor of terrorism exception
to the FSIA has not deterred terrorist activity and has hampered the Executive Branch’s ability to handle sensitive foreign
policy issues).
Lozano, supra note 28 at ¶¶ 7-8.

THE FERRINI DOCTRINE

31

among States is limited.265 Quite simply, States cannot challenge their obligation to abide by the four
Geneva Conventions and their ability to alter the scope of their obligation is nearly non-existent.
Indeed, the potential for the Ferrini decision and its progeny to effect a change in customary
international law has serious implications for State action jure imperii during times of war. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that many States, especially dominant or nuclear powers more willing to throw their
weight around militarily, would be opposed to such a change. Ironically, the U.S. amendments to the FSIA
were cited in the Ferrini decision as indicative of an emerging recognition of a human rights exception to
sovereign immunity.266 However, the FSIA amendments, as the Court itself acknowledged in Ferrini, are
highly political and clash with the international principle of State equality.267 Quite simply, the United States
is comfortable with abrogating the immunity of States of its choosing for actions of its choosing but would
likely be vehemently opposed to being subject to the international system envisioned by the Italian Court of
Cassation. Indeed, if the United States refuses to submit to the International Criminal Court, largely out of a
concern for the implications it would have for U.S. actions taken in wartime,268 it is unlikely the United
States would be amenable to a rule that allowed civil suits in the domestic courts of another State for those
same actions. Nevertheless, the Ferrini doctrine, rogue though it may be, is arguably more aligned with
fundamental principles of International law than the U.S. amendments to the FSIA.
C. JURISDICTION
Limiting Ferrini and its progeny to their facts also resolves another obstacle inherent in a broader
reading, that of jurisdiction. Reading Ferrini broadly, Fox views the decision as advocating the abolishment
of the current dualistic system in favor of “a single regime of responsibility where a grave violation of a
fundamental human right amounting to an international crime is established.”269 What this vision overlooks,
according to Fox, is that without the State’s consent to jurisdiction the claim will “remain largely
unrecognized and unenforceable.”270 Only the United States has directly abolished State immunity in its
265

266
267
268

269
270

Admittedly, there are other jus cogens norms that also constitute erga omnes obligations. Barcelona Traction annunciated
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amendments to the FSIA.271 Fox finds this legislation to be an unsatisfactory approach to the issue,
characterizing it as “arbitrary,” “manipulat[ive],” and “partisan.”272 Thus, aside from domestic legislation
purporting to authorize jurisdiction over another State, how does a violation of jus cogens confer jurisdiction
to one State over another? Jurisdiction is a crucial issue but one that does not destroy the legal viability of
the Ferrini doctrine. Indeed, by simply limiting Ferrini and its progeny to their facts, it is clear that civil
jurisdiction by the domestic courts of a State over another State that has committed a grave breach of any of
the four Geneva Conventions can only occur when one of the traditional bases273 of jurisdiction is present:
subjective or objective territoriality; nationality; or passive personality.274
By giving a narrow reading to Ferrini and its progeny a logically consistent and arguably legally
defensible rule emerges. A conservative formulation of substantive and procedural aspects of the rule limited
to well-established and universally accepted international law ironically increases the potential for its
ultimate purpose of radically altering the customary international law of State immunity.

IV.

CONCLUSION: VIABILITY AND IMPACT

The Ferrini decision and its progeny mark a seminal line of cases given its potential to force States to
reevaluate their stance on the issue of State immunity. Rather than attempting to discover an existent rule of
international law that abrogates State immunity in these situations, the Italian Court of Cassation should accept its
role as a trendsetter. However, this makes the Court’s decisions deviations from established international law and
therefore “unlawful.”275 As such, it is eminently important for the Court to clearly articulate its reasoning in a
rational and precise way in order to persuade other States to accept the Ferrini doctrine for what it is—a
proposed new rule of international law. The narrow reading proposed by this paper would do much to advance
the legitimacy of the doctrine thereby increasing the likelihood that it will effect a change in customary
international law on State immunity. However, just because there can be a change in customary international law
on State immunity based on the Ferrini doctrine does not mean that such a change is advisable.
Why should individuals be allowed to bring civil suits against a State especially if the abrogation of State
officials’ functional immunity for jus cogens violations is already well-established? Even assuming the
violating State does not provide an adequate forum it is unclear why the abrogation of function immunity of
State officials by the domestic courts of a foreign State is not sufficient—why must the State itself have its
immunity stripped? There are three possible reasons. First, there is a moral argument. Quite simply it means
more to victims to have a judgment against a State than a mere individual. But, this is far from a compelling
justification. Second, suing the State directly avoids the possible difficulty of identifying the individual
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officials were responsible for the harm. However, pinpointing the responsible parties is required in any civil
case.276 Just because pegging the State would be expedient does not mean it is just. Moreover, there is no
principled reason why the identification of wrongdoers for cases involving violations of jus cogens—an
incredibly serious allegation—should be legally easier than for a “routine” wrongful death or other personal
injury claim. Third, the State has deep pockets while it is likely that the government official does not. Facially,
this is a weak argument. The victim is stuck with the tortfeasor; if you can't get blood out of a stone too bad,
the victim is out of luck. On the other hand, in cases with government officials the State actually provided the
individuals with the funding, resources, and authority to carry out the violations. Thus, there is a much stronger
argument that the State’s deep pockets should be available to provide redress for those injuries since the State’s
pockets were involved in facilitating them. Although this third argument carries some heft, it is unlikely to
outweigh the other prominent considerations that counsel against the Ferrini doctrine.
There are three principal reasons why the Ferrini doctrine, even the narrow version proposed above, is
an unwise proposition. First, the gravity of a determination that a State is liable, even civilly, for violations
of jus cogens cannot be overstated. However, the Ferrini doctrine would allow such momentous
determinations based on international law to be made in trial level domestic courts. As the State’s
appearance is unlikely, default judgments would be routine. Default judgments are particularly inappropriate
in this context given the heinous nature of the wrongs alleged and the potential ramifications of such
violations on a State-to-State level. After all, violations of jus cogens that are erga omnes constitute a breach
of obligations owed to every State. Thus, States themselves have the primary—and some may argue the
exclusive—interest in such violations. Even if a State were to appear, in countries such as the United States,
liability for international wrongs would be decided by lay citizens in the form of juries rather than learned
jurists. Additionally, this decentralized method of decision-making could result in incongruous outcomes
with some courts finding liability and others not finding liability even within the same State.277 In short, the
Ferrini doctrine places the power to make a crucial determination as to an international obligation in the
hands of innumerable municipal domestic tribunals. This decentralized, provincial method of determination
is inappropriate given the international character of: (1) the nature of the duty (jus cogens) as binding on all
States; and (2) to whom the obligation is owed (erga omnes), i.e., to all States. While each State has the
authority to determine what its reaction will be to another State’s violation of jus cogens, the initial
determination that there has been a violation should be an international one. This determination should
arguably be made by the concerned States themselves, the international community through a collective
resolution, or a ruling of an international judicial body such as the ICJ.278
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Second, on the individual State level, a determination that another State has violated jus cogens is a political
question. Thus, the judiciary should decline to entertain a claim—civil or otherwise—absent a determination on
the issue of liability of the foreign State for a violation of jus cogens by the executive branch with substantial
deference by the judiciary to that determination. Some have argued that Article 2 of the Institut de Droit
International’s Resolution on The Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of Their State279
(“the Resolution”) undermines the political question doctrine.280 Article 2 provides:
National courts, when called upon to adjudicate a question related to the exercise of executive
power, should not decline competence on the basis of the political nature of the question if such
exercise of power is subject to a rule of international law.
Even assuming that the Resolution constitutes a persuasive authority, its articles must be read in
context, i.e., a direction to the national courts of States to determine the compliance of their own State with
international law. Moreover, Article 7 explicitly endorses the existence of a political question doctrine,281 at
least the form such doctrine takes in the United States, by allowing deference to “the ascertainment of facts
pertaining to the international relations of the forum State or other States.”282 Indeed, such an ascertainment
constitutes “prima facie evidence of the existence of such facts.”283
As the proposed narrow reading of the Ferrini doctrine would only apply to grave breaches of the
four Geneva Conventions, determination as to the method of compensation does not create an issue
merely of treaty interpretation for which courts have competence.284 Rather, the four Geneva
Conventions create no such private right of action,285 thus, to the extent that a State adopts the Ferrini
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See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) (referring to the Third Geneva Convention and concluding “[i]t is,
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political and military authorities.”). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (citing footnote 14 of Johnson v. Eisentrager as support for the conclusion that the Geneva Conventions do not confer a
private right of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion did not reach the issue of whether the Geneva
Conventions confer a private right of action because as part of the law of war covered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
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doctrine there would have to be some implementing legislation recognizing that cause of action.
However, the initial determination as to whether there has been a grave breach is, at the very least, a
determination that should be reserved to the executive.286 Indeed, such a determination goes beyond
mere State immunity, a jurisdictional issue, to implicate the Act of State Doctrine, a substantive issue.287
It would be disastrous to foreign policy and international relations to have ad hoc decentralized
determinations of whether another State’s actions constitute a violation of international law.
Third, allowing civil suits against States is a hollow privilege because unless radical changes are
made to State immunity with respect to State assets, plaintiffs will never meaningfully collect on these
judgments if they are able to collect at all. The issue of immunity from suit is wholly separate from the
issue of immunity from attachment and execution. Perhaps the starkest example of this is the Victims of
Terrorism judgments in the United States stemming from the State sponsor of terrorism exception to the
FSIA. In a lengthy and impassioned opinion, Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia systematically laid out the problems with the private litigation model. 288
The Court decried the fact that “the overwhelming majority of successful FSIA plaintiffs with
judgments against Iran still have not received the relief that our courts have determined they are entitled
to under the law”289 and noted “the resistance of the Executive Branch to legislation permitting the
execution of court judgments through assets of state sponsors of terrorism.”290 Even assuming there
were enough Iranian assets within the United States to satisfy the more than one thousand plaintiffs291
and billions of dollars in judgments, the assets are often “held by certain large financial institutions that
are in fact agencies or instrumentalities of other foreign nations, which are in and of themselves subject
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Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). The classic formulation of the doctrine provides:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
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In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121, 125–26 (emphasizing the negative impact allowing such suits to proceed and the subsequent court battles over
attachment have had on the Executive Branch’s foreign policy objectives by the Court).
Id. at 120.
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to sovereign immunity under the FSIA.”292 Given the limited assets held by a State abroad, plaintiffs
who win the race to the courthouse will be the most likely to realize their judgments to the exclusion of
other “equally deserving victims” who are left with nothing.293 Due to the inability to collect on
judgments, the private litigation route is an illusory remedy giving victims false hope—a “meaningless
kabuki dance.”294 In short, it is counterproductive and cruel to allow such suits. Counterproductive, by
allowing judicial resources to be expended issuing judgments incapable of execution and likely to
constrain the foreign policy prerogative of the executive. Cruel, by giving victim-plaintiffs a scheme of
justice that is merely a Potemkin village.
As a normative matter, the political implications identified above counsel against such a doctrine.
There is likely good reason that other States have not gone the route of the United States with its ad hoc
abrogation of State immunity for civil suit or responded favorably to the Ferrini line of cases out of Italy—it
just does not make sense legally or politically to allow civil suits for violations of international law—war
crimes or otherwise. While the February 2012 ICJ decision dealt a blow to the Ferrini doctrine it was not
fatal. There is little reason to believe that the Italian courts which were brazen enough to expound the
doctrine and continue to apply and even expand upon it in the face of opposition will be cowed into
conformity. Moreover, the ruling while influential in the development of international law is—by the ICJ’s
own statutory provision regarding the sources of international law—only a secondary source,295 State
practice is far more important. Thus, regardless of the ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy if the Ferrini
doctrine is able to gain traction, customary international law on State immunity may undergo a change.
Thus, while the Ferrini doctrine has potential to impact customary international law on State immunity the
legal and practical implications of doing so are far from positive.
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